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Abstract 
 
  
By distinguishing between four general notions of uncertainty (good-
expected, bad-expected, good-unexpected, bad-unexpected) within a 
common and simple framework, we show that it is bad-unexpected 
uncertainty shocks that generate a negative reaction of macroeconomic 
variables (such as investment and consumption), and asset prices. Other 
notions of uncertainty might produce even positive responses in the 
macroeconomy. We also show that small uncertainty shocks might have 
larger impacts on economic activity and financial markets than bigger shocks 
between one to three years after its realization. We explore the time and 
magnitude of uncertainty shocks by means of a novel distributed lag 
nonlinear model. Our results help to elucidate the real and complex nature of 
uncertainty, which can be both a backward or forward-looking expected or 
unexpected event, with markedly different consequences for the economy. 
They have implications for policy making, asset pricing and risk 
management. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C58, E20, E44, G10 
 
Keywords: Uncertainty, Economic activity, Asset prices 
 
 
 
Helena Chuliá: Department of Econometrics & Riskcenter-IREA, Universidad de Barcelona. 
Email: hchulia@edu 
 
Jorge M. Uribe: Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, Open University of Catalonia. 
Email: juribeg@uoc.edu 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This work was supported by Fundación Ramón Areces [2017 Social Sciences grant] and the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy [grant numbers ECO2016-76203-C2-2-P, ECO2015-66314-R]. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Uncertainty is a primary concern in economics and finance and among scientists in general. 
Bernstein (1998) goes as far as claiming that the interest in measuring and mastering uncertainty 
marks an important threshold separating modern times from the previous thousands of years of 
scientific history. Today, it is commonly accepted that uncertainty must be measured, because it 
is closely related to many economic phenomena. It is related to decisions on current and 
expected consumption, real and financial investment, to business cycles dynamics, saving 
decisions, prices of goods and assets, and to the possibility of consumption risk sharing. In short, 
it is at the core of the study of macroeconomic wellbeing. Empirically, uncertainty has generally 
been assimilated to a time-varying conditional second moment of the series under study, closely 
linked to underlying time- varying structural shocks, such as terrorist attacks, political events, 
economic crises, bubble collapses, systemic risk materialization episodes, wars and credit 
crunches.  
In what follows we conduct a comprehensive empirical examination of the effects of 
macroeconomic uncertainty on real and financial markets. Our approach is simple and takes 
distance from the previous literature because in our estimations we distinguish not only between 
‘bad’ uncertainty, related to bad news in the market (i.e. negative growth, financial losses, wars 
and destabilizing political events, etc.) and ‘good’ uncertainty related to good news in the market 
(i.e. technological innovation, financial gains, economic growth, etc.), but also between 
‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ uncertainty. Expected uncertainty is of course still uncertainty, in 
the sense that it stands on the fact that the consequences of the decisions of any economic agent 
cannot be predicted with certainty, but instead agents must form expectations about such 
consequences in order to be able to set their inter-temporal optimal paths of consumption and 
saving. Nevertheless, we decompose total uncertainty into two parts: first an expected 
component, which proxies for the amount of variation that agents can anticipate for a given 
variable of interest, and an unexpected component, which is related to the amount of the 
variation that agents cannot predict.  
This approach allows us to empirically assess the effects of uncertainty on the real economy and 
the financial markets from a more general perspective than the extant literature. In so doing we 
present our results within a common empirical structure that compares the effects of our four 
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general notions of uncertainty. We aim to provide a comprehensive yet simple framework 
helpful to understand the effects of uncertainty on the macroeconomy, and to disentangle the 
kind of uncertainty that more closely resembles what is expected from the theory. We show that 
indeed the notion of ‘uncertainty’, that is often empirically assimilated to a conditional second 
moment of economic activity (or its expectation), indeed is more related to the notion of what 
we identify here as ‘bad unexpected uncertainty’, which is a construct much more specific than 
volatility or expected volatility. Other general notions of uncertainty, like expected good and bad 
volatility or unexpected good uncertainty, impact the economic activity in a variety of ways that 
do not always coincide with theoretical models that treat investment as a real option, and in 
which given its irreversibility, the optimal approach to managing uncertainty is the strategy of 
‘wait and see’. Indeed our results indicate that, in general, the effects generally claimed to follow 
an uncertainty shock are clearly linked to a bad-unexpected uncertainty shock. 
Our work stands on the theoretical and empirical work developed by Segal et al. (2015) and 
Berger et al. (2019). The former study claims that good and bad macro-volatility shocks have 
different impacts on financial prices and on the real economy. It shows that actual investment, 
expected consumption, prices and other macro-indicators react very asymmetrically to ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ volatility shocks (with positive and negative responses respectively). They also show 
that the market prices such asymmetric risks in economical and statistical significant ways. On 
the other hand, the latter study shows that it is (backwards) realized-volatility instead of 
(forwards) realized volatility what significantly depresses the economy and the market. In our 
approach we blend the insights of both studies, by recognizing that uncertainty can be ‘bad’ or 
‘good’ with economically significant different consequences and, at the same time, it can be 
expected (forward looking) or unexpected (backwards looking). Our approach follows the 
simple empirical line of Segal et al. (2015), which uses realized semivariances of industrial 
production to measure good and bad uncertainty shocks, but in addition to them we consider 
the differences between forward and backward-looking uncertainty. Unlike Berger et al. (2019), 
we distinguish between expected and unexpected volatility instead of realized and expected 
volatilities. That is, we specifically measure the unexpected component of the total realized 
series, which is blended in the notion of realized volatility. In this sense we follow the general 
idea of Jurado et al. (2015) according to which uncertainty is related to the volatility of the 
unexpected component of the series under analysis, more than to the total volatility.  
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We go one step further by considering nonlinearities in the propagation of uncertainty shocks, 
both in time and across the magnitudes of uncertainty. We do so because the macroeconomics 
literature has recently provided theoretical prescriptions and empirical evidence of nonlinear 
dynamics and amplification mechanisms following uncertainty shocks to the financial markets 
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). This nonlinearity is important because it is related to 
systemic risk and must be fully understood if we want to avoid negative spirals from the real to 
the financial markets, as those observed during the Great Recession. These spirals make recovery 
more difficult and costly. Negative spirals and endogenous uncertainty amplification 
mechanisms have the potential for destabilizing markets. Even small shocks to the economy 
might end up in a dramatic recession, if certain frictions present in the financial markets amplify 
the original shocks. To this end we employ a Distributed Lag Nonlinear model proposed by 
Gasparrini et al. (2010) in the field of medical statistics, which allows us to analyze possible 
nonlinearities on the effects of uncertainty along the time and scale dimensions. This 
methodology is based on the definition of a ‘cross-basis’, a bi-dimensional space of functions 
that describes simultaneously the shape of the relationship across both the space of the predictor 
and the lag dimension of the occurrence. We find that the more significant effects after an 
unexpected-bad uncertainty shock concentrate in magnitudes bellow the mean of the uncertainty 
indicator, and not necessarily on the tail of ‘big’ uncertainty shocks, as one might expect. This 
result highlights the importance of measuring the unexpected uncertainty, even in small 
magnitudes for policy making and financial investment decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the data we use. Results are in Section 
5. Section 6 presents our concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Uncertainty and the real economy 
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The current paradigm for understanding uncertainty was developed within the framework of 
irreversible investment, in which a firm’s future investment opportunities are treated as real 
options and the importance of waiting until the uncertainty is resolved is emphasized. Hence, 
aggregate uncertainty shocks1 are thought to be followed by a reduction in investment, and 
possibly in labor, and, consequently, by a deterioration in real activity (Bernanke, 1983; Bertola 
and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996; Leahy and Whited, 1996; Caballero and Pindyck, 
1996; Bloom et al., 2007; Bachmann and Bayer, 2013; Jurado et al., 2015; Chuliá et al., 2017; 
Meinen and Roehe, 2017). Nevertheless, some studies point out that after the original worsening 
of the variables, a rebound effect related to a ‘volatility over-shoot’ may be observed (Bloom, 
2009; Bloom et al., 2014; Chuliá et al., 2017). It is worth noting that these original impacts on 
the macroeconomic variables may be amplified as a result of financial market frictions (Arellano 
et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, if the uncertainty shock is positive and related to good news in the economy, the 
negative effects of uncertainty should disappear (or even become positive), as the probability of 
losses related to investment reduces and as the agents realize the true nature of uncertainty (see 
Gilchrist and Williams (2005), or Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for a discussion of the potential 
expansionary roles of uncertainty). On the contrary, a negative uncertainty shock should generate 
a more pronounced negative reaction, associated with smaller or even insignificant rebounds in 
the economy activity (Segal et al., 2015).   
The study of uncertainty is not confined to the firm’s investment problem. For example, Romer 
(1990) suggests that consumers may postpone their acquisition of durable goods in episodes of 
increasing uncertainty. Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. (2010) have studied the 
negative relationship between volatility and economic growth. 
 
2.2. Uncertainty and financial markets 
                                                        
1 Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) explain possible sources of inefficiency in the investment process arising from 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, under high-powered incentives and risk-averse managers. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) 
also study the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks on business cycles.  
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The effects of uncertainty on equity prices and other financial variables have also been analyzed. 
In this stream, a notable example is given by Bansal and Yaron (2004) who provide a model in 
which markets dislike uncertainty and worse long-run growth prospects reduce equity prices. In 
the same vein, the study by Bekaert et al. (2009) finds that uncertainty plays an important role in 
the term structure dynamics and that it is the main force behind the counter-cyclical volatility of 
asset returns. 
More recently, Campbell et al. (2012) have analyzed the role of uncertainty in an extended 
version of the inter- temporal capital asset-pricing model. These authors report mixed results 
regarding the sign of the exposure to volatility on the side of asset returns. In a related study, 
Bansal et al. (2014) investigate the implications of macroeconomic volatility for the time variation 
in risk premia and for the cross-section of returns. They propose a conditional capital asset-
pricing model (CAPM) in which aggregate volatility acts as a risk factor, in addition to cash flow 
and the discount rate. They find that both, the betas and the market price of uncertainty are 
negative, and therefore that uncertainty positively contributes to explain equity risk premium. 
Moreover a recent study by Ludvigson et al. (2017) finds that higher uncertainty about real 
economic activity in recessions is most often an endogenous response of the system to other 
shocks that cause business cycle fluctuations, while uncertainty about financial markets is a likely 
source of the fluctuations (an exogenous impulse). 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Empirical measures of uncertainty and estimation of good and bad volatility shocks 
Empirical studies have frequently relied on proxies of uncertainty, most of which have the 
advantage of being directly observable. Such proxies include stock returns or their 
implied/realized volatility (i.e., VIX or VXO), the cross-sectional dispersion of firms’ profits 
(Bloom, 2009), estimated time-varying productivity (Bloom et al., 2014), the cross-sectional 
dispersion of survey-based forecasts (Dick et al., 2013; Bachmann et al., 2013), credit spreads 
(Fendoglu, 2014), and the appearance of ‘uncertainty-related’ key words in the media (Baker et 
al., 2016). Most recently a new branch of the literature has emerged, which proposes measuring 
uncertainty only after the forecastable component of the series has been removed (Carriero et 
al., 2016; Gilchrist et al., 2014; Jurado et al., 2015; Chuliá et al., 2017).  
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In this proposal, we aim to go one step forward, and distinguish bad from good volatility shocks 
to industrial production series. To this end we rely on recently advances about realized variance 
estimation and in particular on realized semivariances as presented by Barndorff-Nielsen et al. 
(2010). In other words, consider the traditional RV estimator, as explained for example in 
Andersen et al. (2010). The RV estimator of the variable Y can be expressed as: 
RV = ∑ ቀY୲ౠ − Y୲ౠషభቁ
ଶ
୬
୨ୀଵ ,     (1) 
where 0 = t଴ < tଵ < ⋯ < t୬ = 1 are the times at which observations are available. This has 
been proven to be an extremely useful methodology to estimate and forecast conditional 
variances for risk management and asset pricing. Nevertheless, Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2010) 
stress out that this measure is silent about the asymmetric behavior of jumps, which is important 
for example to estimate downside or upside risk. Thus, they propose a new RS estimator as 
follows: 
RSି = ∑ ቀY୲ౠ − Y୲ౠషభቁ
ଶ
1ଢ଼౪ౠିଢ଼౪ౠషభஸ଴
୲ౠஸଵ
୨ୀଵ
RSା = ∑ ቀY୲ౠ − Y୲ౠషభቁ
ଶ
1ଢ଼౪ౠିଢ଼౪ౠషభஹ଴
୲ౠஸଵ
୨ୀଵ
 ,   (2) 
where 1୷ is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the argument y is true, and 0 otherwise. 
The former equation provides a direct estimate of downside risk and the latter of upside risk. 
Barndorff-Nielsen et al. (2010) also provide the asymptotic properties of this estimator, using 
the arguments and the central limit theorem for bipower variations of uneven functions, 
developed by Kinnebrock and Podolskij (2008).  
We seek to distinguish expected from unexpected uncertainty, thus following the theoretical 
insights of the model developed by Segal et al. (2015), we define good (bad) expected uncertainty 
as the predictable component of RSା (RSି). The predictable component is estimated as the 
projection of the realized semivariances in (2) on a set of predictors. The set of benchmark 
predictors includes the RSି and RSା own lags, a lag of real consumption growth (∆𝑐௧ିଵ), a lag 
of the real market return (𝑟𝑟௧ିଵெ஺ோ௄ா்), a lag of the real price-earning ratio (𝑃 𝐸⁄ ௧ିଵ), a lag of the 
real risk free rate (𝑟௧ିଵி ), and a lag of the default spread (𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ). Accordingly, we propose 
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to define unexpected uncertainty, both good and bad, as the residual series of the out of sample 
regression, as follows:  
𝑅𝑆௧ି = 𝑏଴ି + 𝑏ଵି𝑅𝑆௧ିଵି + 𝑏ଶି𝑅𝑆௧ିଵା + 𝑏ଷି∆𝑐௧ିଵ + 𝑏ସି  𝑟𝑟௧ିଵெ஺ோ௄ா் + 𝑏ହି 𝑃 𝐸⁄ ௧ିଵ + 𝑏଺
ି𝑟௧ିଵி + 𝑏଻ି𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒃𝒂𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚
+ 𝑢௧ดି
𝑼𝒏.  𝒃𝒂𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒄.
𝑅𝑆௧ା = 𝑏଴ା + 𝑏ଵା𝑅𝑆௧ିଵି + 𝑏ଶା𝑅𝑆௧ିଵା + 𝑏ଷା∆𝑐௧ିଵ + 𝑏ସା𝑟𝑟௧ିଵெ஺ோ௄ா் + 𝑏ହା 𝑃 𝐸⁄ ௧ିଵ + 𝑏଺
ା𝑟௧ିଵி + 𝑏଻ା𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚
+ 𝑢௧ାด
𝑼𝒏.  𝒈𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒖𝒏𝒄.
 (3) 
3.2. Effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on real and financial markets 
Next, we carry our two set of regressions. First, we regress macroeconomic indicators and asset 
prices (x) for horizon h years on the expected variation of real consumption (c)2 and our 
empirical proxies for expected bad uncertainty (Vb) and expected good uncertainty (Vg).  In the 
second set of regressions, we use instead our proxies for unexpected bad uncertainty (Ub) and 
unexpected good uncertainty (Ug): 
1
ℎ
෍ ∆𝑥௧ା௝ = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑐௧ + 𝛽௏೒𝑉௚௧+𝛽௏್𝑉௕௧ +
୦
୨ୀଵ
𝜀௧                           (4) 
1
ℎ
෍ ∆𝑥௧ା௝ = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑐௧ + 𝛽௎೒𝑈௚௧+𝛽௎್𝑈௕௧ +
୦
୨ୀଵ
𝜀௧                         (5)  
where h=1 and 5 years. In our explanatory regressions we used standardized variables on both 
sides of equations (4) and (5) in order to make regression coefficient among the variables and 
among the regressions comparable (this is called in the statistical literature as a “beta-coefficient 
regression”).  In this case, the intercepts are by construction set equal to zero and the slopes are 
directly measured in relative terms, which allow us to read their magnitude on top of their sign.  
Finally, to measure the nonlinear effects in time and magnitude of uncertainty we introduce to 
the economics literature the model proposed by Gasparrini et al. (2010). This is a distributed lag 
non-linear model (DLNM), which corresponds to a modeling framework that is able to 
simultaneously represent non-linear exposure–response dependencies and delayed effects. 
                                                        
2 We include the expected variation of real consumption growth following Segal et al. (2015).To construct a proxy 
for the expected consumption growth rate, we use a similar approach to Equation (3). 
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Following the original proposal, consider a general model representation to describe the time 
series of outcomes 𝑌௧ with 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 given by: 
𝑔(𝜇௧) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑠௝൫𝑥௧௝; 𝜷௝൯
௃
௝ୀଵ + ∑ 𝛾௞𝑢௧௞
௄
௞ୀଵ ,      (6) 
where 𝜇௧ ≡ 𝐸(𝑌), 𝑔 is a monotonic link function that belongs to the set of distributions of the 
exponential family. The functions 𝑠௝ denote smoothed relations between the variables 𝑥௝ and 
the linear predictor, defined by the parameters contained in vectors 𝜷௝ . The variables 𝑢௞ include 
other predictors with linear effects specified by the associated coefficients 𝛾௞. Gasparrini et al. 
(2010) define a DLNM as follows:  
𝑠(𝑥௧; 𝜼) = ∑ ∑ 𝐫௧௝.் 𝐜.௞𝜂௝௞ =
ణ೗
௞ୀଵ 𝐰௧ .்
ణೣ
௝ୀଵ 𝜼,    (7) 
where 𝐫௧௝. is a vector of lagged series for the time t transformed through the basis function j.  In 
turn, a basis function is defined as a set of transformations of the original variable 𝑥௧ that 
generate a new set of variables termed basis variables. The main choices typically rely on functions 
describing smooth curves, such as polynomials or spline functions (as in our case).  The vector 
𝐰௧.is obtained by applying the 𝜗௫ ∙ 𝜗௟  cross-basis functions to 𝑥௧. Extending the idea of basis, a 
cross-basis is a bi-dimensional space of functions describing simultaneously the shape of the 
relationship along 𝑥 and its distributed lag effects. The matrix 𝐂 that consists of vector elements 
𝐜.௞ is a (𝐿 + 1) × 𝜗௟  matrix of basis variables derived from the application of the specific basis 
functions to the lag vector ℓ, and 𝜼 is a vector of unknown parameters. 
4. Data 
 
We use annual data from 1929 to 2016 for real gross domestic product, gross private domestic 
investment, non-residential gross domestic investment, real personal consumption expenditures 
in durable goods and services (chained 2009 dollars) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Moody’s seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond yields (annual end of the period), and effective 
federal funds rate data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED of St. Louis). 
Consumer price index, earnings, real dividend and S&P were retrieved from Robert Shiller’s web 
page. Additionally, we use market return and risk free rate data from Keneth French’s web page. 
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We use monthly data on real industrial production from the FRED to estimate annual good 
(bad) expected (unexpected) uncertainty in the aggregated macroeconomy.  
5. Results 
 
In Tables 1 and 2 we show the results of our regressions in Equations (4) and (5), which employ 
standardized versions of the series to make the magnitude of the associated coefficients 
alongside the variables comparable. The theoretical model proposed by Segal et al. (2015) 
motivates each of the two sets of regressions for the macroeconomic series and for asset price 
series. In each set of regressions we included expected consumption, on top of good and bad 
uncertainty as explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we changed the definition of good and bad 
uncertainty in both cases. In the first columns we present the case when uncertainty is defined 
as the expected volatility of real monthly GDP growth, while for the latter columns we defined 
uncertainty as the unexpected component of such volatility. As explained before, the volatility 
of industrial production was modeled like realized semivariances that build upon positive and 
negative growth rates in order to distinguish between good and bad uncertainty. Then, the 
expected component was modeled using a linear regression that includes lags of the 
semivariances (good and bad), consumption growth, the real market return, the price to earning 
ratio and the default spread, within the explanatory variables set. The unexpected component 
corresponds to the residual of the regression in each period. In Table 1 uncertainty forecast was 
made projecting the semivariance one year ahead, which means that we used up to year t 
observations to predict t+1 industrial production growth volatility, while in table two, forecasting 
was conducted using five years ahead forecasts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Effects of macroeconomic uncertainty (1 year ahead forecasts) 
 
The table shows the beta-coefficients of the effects of the expected variation of real consumption (c), 
good-expected (Vg), bad-expected (Vb), good-unexpected (Ug) and bad-unexpected (Ub) uncertainty on 
macroeconomic indicators and asset prices (Equations (4) and (5)). It also shows the adjusted R2’s of 
these regressions. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive 
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regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while 
the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time. Bold 
numbers indicate the significance of the coefficients. T-statistics in parenthesis.   
 
   Expected    Unexpected  
  c Vg Vb Adj-R2  c Ug Ub Adj-R2 
Macroeconomic Aggregates 
Consumption growth 
  
0,58 
(4,95) 
-0,21 
(-1,33) 
0,18 
(2,17) 37,37 
 0,54 
(4,52) 
0,28 
(1,94) 
-0,26 
(-2,28) 44,24 
GDP Growth 
  
0,46 
(4,53) 
-0,01 
(-0,04) 
0,20 
(2,13) 27,74 
 0,42 
(4,19) 
0,05 
(0,34) 
-0,30 
(-3,93) 32,93 
Market dividend 
growth   
0,27 
(1,61) 
-0,12 
(-0,90) 
0,10 
(0,75) 6,67 
 0,25 
(1,45) 
0,15 
(1,16) 
-0,16 
(-1,24) 9,33 
Earnings Growth 
  
-0,11 
(-0,69) 
0,24 
(1,99) 
0,21 
(1,78) 8,98 
 -0,16 
(-0,89) 
-0,19 
(-1,55) 
-0,40 
(-1,79) 17,32 
Gross capital 
investment growth   
0,43 
(4,47) 
0,01 
(0,10) 
0,23 
(1,64) 28,25 
 0,39 
(4,23) 
0,05 
(0,37) 
-0,34 
(-2,93) 34,42 
Non-residencial 
investment growth   
0,62 
(6,50) 
-0,23 
(-2,30) 
0,02 
(0,21) 40,74 
 0,60 
(6,19) 
0,21 
(1,94) 
-0,04 
(-0,48) 39,83 
Asset Prices 
Price/earning ratio  0,53 (3,51) 
0,32 
(2,53) 
-0,54 
(-4,05) 44,85 
 0,55 
(3,27) 
-0,30 
(-2,90) 
0,43 
(3,21) 38,73 
Risk free rate  0,04 (0,22) 
-0,04 
(-0,22) 
-0,23 
(-1,61) 1,15 
 0,05 
(0,28) 
0,00 
(-0,02) 
0,23 
(1,59) 0,11 
Default spread  -0,41 (-3,36) 
0,24 
(2,63) 
-0,23 
(-2,33) 22,36 
 -0,35 
(-2,51) 
-0,32 
(-3,21) 
0,36 
(2,14) 32,95 
Market return  -0,27 (-2,24) 
0,05 
(0,44) 
0,24 
(2,00) 6,62 
 -0,32 
(-2,32) 
0,05 
(0,50) 
-0,39 
(-2,96) 14,12 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic reaction: First, we focus on the macroeconomic reactions to uncertainty. From the 
theory we know that consumption, real income, market dividend, earnings and both residential 
and nonresidential investment are expected to plunge after an uncertainty shock is observed. 
Nevertheless, positive uncertainty is expected to stimulate economic activity and therefore to 
positively impact macroeconomic variables. In general lines, we observe that these theoretical 
insights seem to hold for the case when uncertainty is defined as unexpected volatility, but not very 
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much for the expected component of uncertainty. It is also evident that, in terms of statistical 
significance and magnitude, bad unexpected uncertainty if far more relevant than its expected or 
good counterparts. Agents care more about bad news and especially when this news is beyond 
their original expectations. This is also confirmed by the fact that in most of the regressions the 
adjusted R squared is larger for the models that work with unexpected uncertainty.  
Indeed, when we define uncertainty as the expected component of volatility we get 
counterintuitive signs in some cases. For instance, the impact of bad expected uncertainty on 
consumption and income is positive and statistically significant (0.18 and 0.20 respectively), while 
the impact of good uncertainty is not insignificant. However, positive and negative unexpected 
uncertainties render comparable effects on consumption (0.28 and -0.26 respectively) that agree 
with theoretical expectations. In the case of GDP, earnings growth and gross capital investment, 
the impact of unexpected uncertainty is negative and statistically significant. Only for market 
dividend and nonresidential investment, even when bad unexpected uncertainty preserves the 
right theoretical sign, it remains statistically not significant. Noticeable the expected component 
of good uncertainty decreases nonresidential investment while it increases earnings. 
When we examine the R2 of the regressions we confirm that the unexpected component of 
uncertainty explain better the variations of the macroeconomic series than the models with their 
expected counterparts (the only exception being the model for non-residential investments that 
shows similar R2 statistics in both cases, slightly above for the former model with expected 
variables than for the model that includes the unexpected ones (40.74 against 39.83 
respectively)).  
 
Asset price reaction: Now we turn our attention to the effects of uncertainty on asset prices. This 
time, for the case of the stock market premium and the default spread the story comes across 
the same lines than for the case of the macroeconomic variables analyzed above. That is, the 
unexpected component of uncertainty has a greater impact than the expected component, which 
is particularly larger for the case of bad unexpected uncertainty. This impact is statistically 
significant in the model with unexpected uncertainty, and also agrees with the theoretical signs. 
Only for the case of the market price/earning ratio, expected uncertainty aligns more with the 
theoretical expected signs, 0.32 for good expected uncertainty and -0.54 for bad expected 
uncertainty. Note that this situation reverts for the model with unexpected variations of 
13 
 
uncertainty (-0.30 and 0.43 for good unexpected and bad unexpected uncertainty respectively). 
Our proxy for the real risk free rate does not seem to be explained by neither of the two models 
(with R2 statistics close to zero in both cases). 
Table 2 presents the results when we construct our uncertainty proxies using five-years ahead 
forecasts instead of one-year ahead out of sample forecasts. Most noticeable, all the theoretical 
signs of unexpected uncertainty are fulfilled by the regressions. Moreover the models that 
include the unexpected component of volatility present, in general, a better adjustment than the 
models that include the expected component of volatility in the set of regressors, as measured 
by the associated R2’s of each regression. The latter holds for both, macroeconomic series and 
asset prices. We also observe a reduction in the model adjustment when we compare the R2’s 
reported in table 2 with those recorded in table 1. This reduction most likely follows from a 
reduction of the explanatory power of expected consumption on the macroeconomic series and 
asset prices than from the overall effect of uncertainty. Indeed, in the case of good unexpected 
uncertainty, we observe an increase in the magnitude of the effect on consumption, GDP growth 
and gross capital investment compared to those recorded in table 1. In all these cases the effect 
increases to the point to becoming larger than the opposite effect of bad uncertainty, which 
anyway still remains significant in all the three cases. For other variables such as market dividend 
or earnings growth the effect of positive unexpected uncertainty remains statistically insignificant 
even when bad uncertainty is significant. Only for the risk free rate the model with expected 
uncertainties renders a larger R2’s than the model with unexpected uncertainties. Interestingly, 
while bad expected uncertainty reduces the risk free rate in 0.24 points, bad unexpected 
uncertainty increases it by 0.26 points. 
All in all, we show that, in general, the effects generally claimed to follow an uncertainty shock 
are clearly linked to a bad-unexpected uncertainty shock. The effects of other general notions of 
uncertainty, like expected good and bad volatility or unexpected good uncertainty, do not always 
coincide with theoretical expected effects. 
Table 2. Effects of macroeconomic uncertainty (5 year ahead forecasts) 
 
The table shows the beta-coefficients of the effects of the expected variation of real consumption (c), good-
expected (Vg), bad-expected (Vb), good-unexpected (Ug) and bad-unexpected (Ub) uncertainty on 
macroeconomic indicators and asset prices (Equations (4) and (5)). It also shows the adjusted R2’s of these 
regressions. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample five-year ahead recursive regressions, 
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with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent 
estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time. Bold numbers indicate the 
significance of the coefficients. T-statistics in parenthesis.   
 
   Expected    Unexpected  
  c Vg Vb Adj-R2  c Ug Ub Adj-R2 
Macroeconomic Aggregates 
Consumption growth 
  
-0,03 
(-0,34) 
0,01 
(0,07) 
-0,19 
-1,50) -1,54  
0,10 
(0,85) 
0,54 
(2,78) 
-0,30 
(-1,84) 14,79 
GDP Growth 
  
-0,09 
(-0,90) 
0,00 
(-0,03) 
-0,05 
(-0,46) -3,38  
0,00 
(0,04) 
0,40 
(3,44) 
-0,31 
(-4,27) 12,39 
Market dividend 
growth   
-0,08 
(-0,57) 
-0,04 
(-0,27) 
0,22 
(1,47) 0,56  
-0,08 
(-0,55) 
0,06 
(0,58) 
-0,32 
(-2,86) 6,77 
Earnings Growth 
  
-0,01 
(-0,05) 
-0,06 
(-0,67) 
0,02 
(0,25) -4,79  
0,04 
(0,38) 
0,28 
(1,52) 
-0,31 
(-1,87) 2,93 
Gross capital 
investment growth   
-0,05 
(-0,66) 
-0,10 
(-0,98) 
0,03 
(0,29) -3,48  
0,03 
(0,44) 
0,42 
(3,72) 
-0,34 
(-4,99) 13,90 
Non-residencial 
investment growth 
 -0,07 
(-0,81) 
-0,07 
(-0,49) 
0,11 
(1,03) -3,78  
-0,04 
(-0,41) 
0,21 
(1,67) 
-0,30 
(-3,93) 3,14 
Asset Prices 
Price/earning ratio   
0,37 
(2,45) 
-0,31 
(-1,95) 
0,35 
(2,79) 15,31  
0,38 
(2,35) 
0,26 
(2,03) 
-0,40 
(-4,16) 19,96 
Risk free rate   
-0,23 
(-1,12) 
-0,15 
(-0,88) 
-0,24 
(-1,70) 18,51  
-0,27 
(-1,15) 
0,04 
(0,25) 
0,26 
(1,95) 14,05 
Default spread   
-0,11 
(-0,83) 
-0,16 
(-1,02) 
0,10 
(0,87) -1,51  
-0,23 
(-1,52) 
-0,40 
(-1,70) 
0,43 
(2,23) 14,02 
Market Returns   
-0,18 
(-1,63) 
0,15 
(1,33) 
0,19 
(1,86) 5,26  
-0,11 
(-0,99) 
0,16 
(1,43) 
-0,46 
(-3,93) 12,77 
 
In what follows we expand our analysis as to consider possible nonlinearities on the effect of 
uncertainty over the macroeconomic indicators and asset prices considered before, both in time 
(across different lags) and alongside the uncertainty indicator itself. We use a distributed lags 
nonlinear model to decompose the effect of uncertainty in time and magnitudes, which allows 
us to explore possible non-linear effects of uncertainty on the economy stressed out by the 
theoretical literature. Figure 1 shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected, 
uncertainties on the annual variation of real consumption growth rate. The reported results were 
drawn from estimations that use annual data from 1950 to 2016. The color scale captures the 
magnitude of the effect in each subplot that reflects the four possible combinations of expected 
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and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional 
on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four 
uncertainty indicators were estimated by out of sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, 
with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the 
subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time. 
By analyzing the figure one can see that, indeed, the effect of uncertainty on consumption is 
nonlinear. According to the results reported in table 1, we also see in this case that bad 
unexpected uncertainty is associated to the more significant negative effects on real 
consumption, while the effect of bad expected uncertainty seems to be the opposite, it increases 
the consumption growth rate. Moreover, bad unexpected uncertainty asserts its larger effects on 
consumption when it is below zero, which corresponds to the variable mean in the standardized 
model. Expected bad uncertainty also has a larger effect when it lies bellow its own mean. In 
terms of time, bad unexpected uncertainty impacts consumption especially during the first two 
years after the shock and in the fifth year following it. The impacts of bad expected uncertainty 
reach a peak the first year after the shock and lasts up to the fourth year.  
 
Good uncertainty is also associated with a negative impact on consumption, with the only 
exception of very high-unexpected good uncertainty levels, which foster consumption the first 
year after uncertainty is realized. This effect seems to revert from year two to four, as can be 
observed in the upper-right panel of the figure. The impacts of good expected uncertainty on 
consumption are mainly negative and focus on very high and low levels of the uncertainty 
indicator.  
 
 
Figure 1. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real 
consumption growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected 
uncertainty on the annual variations of real consumption. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag 
nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time 
dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data 
sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis 
measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at 
different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive 
regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while 
the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
 
 
 Expected Unexpected 
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Figure 2. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real GDP 
growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected uncertainty on the 
annual variations of GDP. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model that allows us 
to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the 
number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The 
color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on 
the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four uncertainty 
indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, with annual data from 
1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent estimations were 
recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 2 coveys the same information than Figure 1, but in relation to real GDP growth. As can 
be observed, the effects of uncertainty are again nonlinear, as represented by different colors on 
the surface of each plot. For instance, unexpected bad uncertainty, which is known to have a 
negative impact on economic activity, from tables 1 and 2, does imply a reduction of economic 
activity from lags 1 to 4 after a shock is observed, but only for relatively small uncertainty shocks 
(bellow the mean of the indicator). In contrast, extremely high-unexpected negative shocks can 
indeed be associated to increments in economic activity, especially from 2 to 5 years after the 
shock. Nevertheless for values of the indicator close to its mean, the effects remain close to zero 
in most of the cases (see the lower-right subplot of figure 2). The effects of expected bad 
uncertainty are also very sizable, particularly for extremely bad-high-expected uncertainty shocks 
(see panel bad-expected). Too much expected good uncertainty also seems to reduce economic 
activity, and only low expected good uncertainty fosters economic activity, as measured by 
income growth.  
The impacts of uncertainty on investment activity (Figure 3) are perhaps the more widely 
documented from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Uncertainty reduces investment 
while the “wait and see” strategy becomes optimal for firms (and households) and even for 
financial investors, until uncertainty is finally realized. Indeed, this behavior is confirmed for 
unexpected bad uncertainty shocks (lower-right panel of figure 3) and for very high levels of 
unexpected bad uncertainty in Figure 4 (non-residential investment). Nevertheless, the 
panorama is again mixed for good unexpected uncertainty shocks, which seem to decrease gross 
investment for relatively small shocks, and to foster it for shocks above the mean of the good 
unexpected uncertainty indicator. On its side, bad expected uncertainty seems to present a 
counterintuitive sign for gross investment, and for nonresidential investment (when it is high). 
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Figure 3. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real gross 
investment growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected 
uncertainty on the annual variations of gross investment. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag 
nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time 
dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data 
sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis 
measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at 
different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive 
regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while 
the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 4. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real gross 
private nonresidential investment growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected 
and unexpected uncertainty on the annual variations of gross private nonresidential investment. The 
effects were estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities 
originating from the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed 
after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the 
magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, 
while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated 
by out sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first 
regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent estimations were recursive, and 
incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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We also estimate the effects of our four different definitions of uncertainty on market dividends 
growth, earnings growth, on the price/earnings ratio, on the default spread and the market equity 
premium in Figures 5 to 9. In general, we document nonlinear responses of the financial markets 
to uncertainty shocks, which depend on the level of the uncertainty indicator and the nature of 
the uncertainty shock. For instance, both good expected and bad unexpected shocks seem to 
have the largest effects on the financial markets, while bad expected shocks have the smallest 
effects. Big good expected uncertainty shocks reduce dividend growth and earnings and increase 
the default spread, while the same expected good uncertainty shocks when small show the 
opposite sign.  
On its side, when the effects of bad expected uncertainty shocks are present they display the 
opposite sign compared to the shocks of the same magnitude bad which are good. Bad 
unexpected uncertainty shocks generate opposite effects dependent on whether they are small 
or big. Big shocks decrease dividend growth (unlike medium size shocks), decrease the price 
earnings ratio and increases the default spread. Once again small bad unexpected uncertainty 
shocks present a larger impact on the financial markets than medium size or large shocks.  
In terms of the real risk free rate we observe that small unexpected uncertainty shocks (both 
good and bad) and good expected uncertainty shocks tend to decrease it, while big good and 
unexpected shocks increase it. The equity premium is also significantly affected by the different 
uncertainty shocks considered here (see Figure 10). Particular noticeable are the negatives effects 
of big good expected uncertainty shocks and small bad unexpected uncertainty shocks.  
All in all, our results show that, in general, the more significant effects after an unexpected-bad 
uncertainty shock concentrate in magnitudes bellow the mean of the uncertainty indicator, and 
not necessarily on the tail of ‘big’ uncertainty shocks, as one might expect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real 
market dividends growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected 
uncertainty on the annual growth of the real market dividend. The effects were estimated by a distributed 
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lag nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and 
time dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data 
sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis 
measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at 
different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive 
regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while 
the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 6. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on real 
earnings growth: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected uncertainty 
on the annual earning growth. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model that allows 
us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the 
number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The 
color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on 
the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four uncertainty 
indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, with annual data from 
1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent estimations were 
recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 7. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on the 
price/earnings ratio: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected 
uncertainty on the price-earning ratio. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model 
that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, 
according to the number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 
1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect 
conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four 
uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, with annual 
data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent 
estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 8. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on the real 
risk free rate: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected uncertainty on 
risk free rate. The effects were estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model that allows us to analyze 
nonlinearities originating from the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the number of 
periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale 
depicts the magnitude of the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty 
level, while the vertical axis shows the effect at different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were 
estimated by out sample one-year ahead recursive regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The 
first regression consisted of 20 observations, while the subsequent estimations were recursive, and 
incorporated one additional observation at a time.  
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Figure 9. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on the default 
spread: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected uncertainty on the 
default spread between yields Moody’s AAA and Moody’s BAA corporate bonds. The effects were 
estimated by a distributed lag nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from 
the level of uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed after the 
uncertainty shock is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of 
the effect. The horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical 
axis shows the effect at different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-
year ahead recursive regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 
20 observations, while the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional 
observation at a time.  
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Figure 10. Impacts of expected and unexpected, good and bad, uncertainty, on the 
equity premium: The figure shows the effect of good and bad, expected and unexpected uncertainty 
on the annual excess return of the market index above the risk free rate. The effects were estimated by a 
distributed lag nonlinear model that allows us to analyze nonlinearities originating from the level of 
uncertainty and time dynamics, according to the number of periods elapsed after the uncertainty shock 
is observed. Data sample spans 1950-2016. The color scale depicts the magnitude of the effect. The 
horizontal axis measures the effect conditional on the uncertainty level, while the vertical axis shows the 
effect at different lags. The four uncertainty indicators were estimated by out sample one-year ahead 
recursive regressions, with annual data from 1929 to 2016. The first regression consisted of 20 
observations, while the subsequent estimations were recursive, and incorporated one additional 
observation at a time.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
We estimate the impacts of different notions of uncertainty on key economic variables and asset 
prices. Specifically, we distinguish between good-expected, good-unexpected, bad-expected and 
bad-unexpected uncertainty shocks. We found that the general understanding of uncertainty, 
which involves treating investment as a real option and which predicts negative reaction of 
prices, investments and economic activity to uncertainty shocks, is more related to the notion of 
unexpected bad uncertainty shocks, which is at odds with the understanding of uncertainty as a 
forward looking effect. We also show that it is only the unexpected component of realized 
volatility which generates the negative dynamics expected from uncertainty.  
 
In the second part of our results we show that small uncertainty shocks might produce the largest 
impacts on economic variables and asset prices, especially between one and three years after the 
shock is realized. To this end we use a novel distributed lags nonlinear model that allow us to 
simultaneously represent non-linear exposure–response dependencies and delayed effects of 
macroeconomic variables to different notions of uncertainty. Overall we document important 
nonlinearities in the propagation of uncertainty to the real and financial markets, which 
motivates a close monitoring of uncertainty evolution that help to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of uncertainty.  
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